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INJECTING FAIRNESS INTO THE DOCTRINE OF 
FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 In the recent case Crawford 
v. Washington,2 the Supreme Court re-iterated the importance of 
preserving this constitutional right to confrontation. Interestingly, in dicta, 
the Crawford Court asserted that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
remains valid.3 Under forfeiture by wrongdoing, the defendant forfeits the 
right to confront the witness if the defendant procured the absence of the 
witness through wrongdoing.4 The tension that exists between 
confrontation and forfeiture by wrongdoing is significant because personal 
freedom is at stake. In order to accommodate the policy concerns of both 
the confrontation clause and the forfeiture doctrine, courts must exercise 
heightened scrutiny to any claim that warrants the application of the 
forfeiture doctrine. 
The murder of a witness before he can testify at trial is always a 
popular film topic, but it is also a regular phenomenon throughout the 
United States.5 Other less dramatic scenarios often result in the same 
dilemma for prosecutors: a witness refuses to testify because of fear of 
retaliation by the defendant,6 a witness refuses to testify because of fear of 
embarrassment as a result of giving public testimony, a witness hides from 
the prosecution with the help of the defendant, or, in an even more 
innocuous situation, a witness is unavailable due to severe injury or 
distance.7 The logical question that arises in cases such as these—where 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 3. 541 U.S. at 62 (“For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an 
alternative means of determining reliability.”). 
 4. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 270–72 (2d Cir. 1982) (witness in a 
drug distribution conspiracy testified in grand jury, but was murdered before the trial occurred). See 
also Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Fighting to Stop Witness Intimidation (CNN television broadcast 
Apr. 12, 2005) (discussing Baltimore’s pervasive problems with witness intimidation, including 
stabbing and shooting deaths of a potential witness by gang members). 
 6. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352–53 (8th Cir. 1976) (witness in a cocaine 
distribution case refused to testify at trial because of threats by one of the defendants). 
 7. See infra notes 44–45. 
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the witness is unable to testify in court—is whether an out-of-court 
statement made by the witness can be used during the presentation of the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief. Courts frequently allow these out-of-court 
statements to be brought in under the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.8 
This Note first explains the general evolution of the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing from the common law to its present codification 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence by examining how court decisions and 
academic interpretation have shaped the doctrine. Important to this 
discussion is the reality that the doctrine is not applied uniformly and its 
present form is far broader than the scope of the original law. In fact, in 
specific circumstances, the elements necessary for application of the 
forfeiture doctrine are not precise, resulting in unpredictable outcomes. 
Next, this Note discusses the Crawford decision, which rejected the 
“indicia of reliability” standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.9 The “indicia 
of reliability” standard allowed courts to admit witness testimony in 
criminal trials without providing the defendant with the opportunity to 
confront the witness if the court believed the evidence was “reliable.”10 
This Note then examines the Crawford ruling and its implications on the 
waiver of the right to confrontation. Next, this Note considers recent cases 
applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to illustrate the expansion 
of the forfeiture doctrine post-Crawford. Finally, this Note considers how 
the Crawford decision can assist in understanding the purpose of the 
forfeiture doctrine and how to effectively preserve the rights guaranteed in 
the Sixth Amendment11 while balancing the interest in the continued use 
of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. 
 8. This doctrine is codified in both the Federal Rules of Evidence and some state statutes. See 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (Hearsay is admissible if it is “[a] statement offered against a party that has 
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the 
declarant as a witness.”). 
 9. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 10. Id. at 66. 
 11. The Sixth Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/13
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II. PRE-CRAWFORD: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORFEITURE BY 
WRONGDOING DOCTRINE 
The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was conceived in an effort to 
accommodate two important interests: on the one hand, the defendant’s 
constitutional right to have an opportunity to confront witnesses; on the 
other hand, the policy interest in giving a voice to witnesses who are 
unavailable to testify as a result of the defendant’s actions.12 Inclusion of 
the Confrontation Clause in the Bill of Rights is indicative of the 
importance the Framers of the United States Constitution placed on 
preserving the defendant’s right to confront all witnesses against him.13 
Guaranteeing the defendant a right to confront any and all witnesses who 
testify against him is significant for at least three reasons: first, cross-
examination is a highly valued tool for revealing the complete truth;14 
second, the formality and solemnity of the swearing-in process and the 
presence of the defendant in the courtroom during the presentation of 
testimony arguably discourage deception;15 and third, the symbolic 
importance of requiring confrontation creates the appearance of fairness 
and justice.16 The prohibition against hearsay statements in trial17 will 
 12. Although prosecutorial intimidation of witnesses is a concern, this Note looks only at the 
actions of defendants. See James Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in 
Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 530–31 (2003). 
 13. See supra note 11.  
 14. John Henry Wigmore stated that cross-examination is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1397 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed., 1974). “This open examination of witnesses viva 
voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the 
private and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk . . . .” WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *373. 
 15. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011, 1042 (1998) [hereinafter Principles] (“The oath is one of the protections accorded the defendant, 
providing some assurance that witnesses will not offer testimony without putting themselves at risk for 
false statement.”). Wigmore pointed out two discrete purposes for confrontation:  
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity 
of cross-examination . . . . [The second purpose is] the judge and the jury are enabled to 
obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness’ deportment while testifying, 
and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. 
WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 1395. 
 16. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) (noting “the strong symbolic purpose served by 
requiring adverse witnesses at trial to testify in the accused’s presence.”). Professor Richard Friedman 
elaborated: 
It is not only fairness to the accused that is at stake, but also the moral responsibility of 
witnesses and of society at large, for “requiring confrontation is a way of reminding ourselves 
that we are, or at least want to see ourselves as, the kind of people who decline to 
countenance or abet what we see as the cowardly and ignoble practice of hidden accusation.” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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frequently preclude the same evidence as the Confrontation Clause for 
analogous reasons.18 
Naturally, a defendant may choose to voluntarily waive his right to 
confront a witness.19 Importantly, for nearly four-hundred years, courts 
have ruled that certain behavior by the defendant will be construed to 
constitute a waiver of this right.20 Although universally accepted, this 
doctrine has only enjoyed codification in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
for the past eight years.21 Although many states follow the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, few have codified the forfeiture exception.22 
Like the forfeiture doctrine today, early forfeiture by wrongdoing cases 
held that when a defendant is directly responsible for the absence of the 
witness at trial, the defendant waives the right to confront that witness.23 
This waiver was limited originally to prior trial testimony or depositions of 
the unavailable witness that had already been taken in the presence of the 
Richard Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2003–2004 CATO 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 439, 443 (2004) (citing Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach 
to the Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003)). 
 17. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802 (providing the general definition of hearsay and generally 
prohibiting its use). Exceptions and exemptions to the hearsay rule are found in Rule 803 (providing a 
list of twenty-three exceptions to the rule against hearsay) and Rule 804 (providing six exceptions 
where the declarant is unavailable to testify). See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
 18. This Note does not consider whether the hearsay prohibition and the Confrontation Clause 
requirement are equivalent. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (indicating that the 
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules are “generally designed to protect similar values.”) (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)). See also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the 
Definition of Chutzpa, 31 IS.L.R. 506, 513 (1997) [hereinafter Chutzpa] (interpreting the Confrontation 
Clause as providing the right to confrontation only when a statement is made against the accused by a 
witness to the crime). But see White, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Neither the 
language of the [Confrontation] Clause nor the historical evidence appears to support the notion that 
the Confrontation Clause was intended to constitutionalize the hearsay rule and its exceptions.”).  
 19. Every case in which a defendant waives his right to a trial and accepts a plea bargain 
constitutes a waiver of the Confrontation Clause.  
 20. The Sixth Amendment requires an affirmative waiver of cross-examination. See Brookhart v. 
Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1966). Courts have also held that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
applies when the defendant disrupts court proceedings. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–43 
(1970) (removal of defendant from the courtroom while a witness is testifying does not destroy the 
defendant’s confrontation right where the defendant refuses to remain silent). 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  
 22. While forty-one states have adopted evidence rules based on the federal rules, only 
Pennsylvania has adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting 
Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 807 (2005). See also Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion 
of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing—Old Wine in a New Bottle—Solving the Mystery of 
the Codification of the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891, 905–06 (2001) 
(arguing that the adoption of the rule was a direct consequence of Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. 
becoming the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules). 
 23. See The Trial of the Lord Morley for Murder before the House of Lords: 18 Charles II. A.D. 
1666, in 6 CABBOT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 770 (London, R. Bagshaw 1810). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/13
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defendant.24 In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court, in Reynolds 
v. United States,25 confronted such a situation and admitted testimony 
procured during an earlier criminal trial against the defendant.26 In this 
type of case, concerns about the defendant’s confrontation rights were 
mitigated because the defendant had the opportunity to confront the 
witness during a deposition or previous trial.27 
Since those incipient cases, courts have expanded their application of 
the doctrine. In United States v. Carlson,28 grand jury testimony was 
admitted after the court held that the defendant had procured the absence 
of the witness.29 The Court held that the grand jury testimony had 
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”; however, it refused to 
decide whether such evidence possessed the “indicia of reliability” 
normally required to admit out-of-court testimony.30 Instead, the court 
admitted the testimony under the theory that the defendant had voluntarily 
forfeited his constitutional right to confront the witness.31 
More recent court decisions have applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine to admit witness statements made to law enforcement agents. In 
United States v. Ochoa,32 statements made to an FBI agent by an 
accomplice to the conspiracy were introduced during trial after the court 
concluded that the witness was unavailable.33 The First Circuit reached a 
similar result in United States v. Houlihan,34 applying the forfeiture 
doctrine to reach statements made to the police by a snitch.35 Houlihan is 
 24. See id. (frequently cited as an early example of wavier of confrontation because of witness 
unavailability: a deposition taken before a coroner was entered into evidence after the court found the 
defendant caused the absence of the witness); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 1405, quoted in Flanagan, 
supra note 12, at 463–64. 
 25. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 26. Id. at 158 (“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, 
he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept 
away.”). 
 27. See WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 1405 (“If the witness has been by the opponent procured to 
absent himself, this ought of itself to justify the use of his deposition or former testimony.”). 
 28. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 29. Id. at 1353. 
 30. Id. at 1357. The court reached this conclusion after analysis of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 
(1970), cited with approval in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004). 
 31. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1360. 
 32. 229 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 33. Id. at 639–41 (On appeal the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
unavailability of the witness due to wrongdoing by the defendant; however, admission of the evidence 
was harmless error). 
 34. 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 35. Id. at 1278–30 (voluntary statements were made by the snitch to police after he was arrested 
on drug trafficking charges). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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significant because it indicates the potential breadth of the forfeiture 
doctrine: immediately after police arrested the snitch on drug-trafficking 
charges, the snitch made the statements incriminating Houlihan.36 Those 
statements were made during the investigation, before the government 
brought any charges against Houlihan.37 When the snitch spoke to the 
police, Houlihan had no knowledge of the content of the statements or 
their intended use in his future prosecution.38 In addition, the statements 
were made in a less-than-formal setting, increasing the likelihood that the 
statements were unreliable, and thus inadmissible.39 The Houlihan Court 
rejected the defense’s claim, that the statements were unreliable, because 
the court interpreted the forfeiture doctrine as eliminating the need to 
establish reliability.40 Whether admission of these statements is correct, 
this type of decision is a direct result of the judicial desire to minimize the 
incentives the law provides for eliminating potential future witnesses.41 
III. REQUISITES FOR FINDING FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING OF THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: UNAVAILABILITY AND WRONGDOING 
A. Unavailability of the Witness 
In order to introduce a prior witness statement on the premise that the 
defendant has forfeited the right to confront that witness, the court must 
first conclude that the witness is unavailable.42 The simplest case of 
unavailability occurs when the witness is no longer alive.43 Similarly, a 
 36. Id. at 1278. 
 37. Id. at 1279. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (statements admitted in the Houlihan trial included oral testimony from a police officer 
who was present during the first statement, and a tape recording of portions of the second statement). 
See also United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 909–13 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (admitting statements made by 
a drug informant during a debriefing by police because the informant was killed before testifying at 
trial).  
 40. “Houlihan’s and Nardone’s misconduct waived not only their confrontation rights but also 
their hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability superfluous.” Houlihan, 92 F.3d 
at 1281. 
 41. Id. at 1279–80. 
 42. The Federal Rules of Evidence describe five types of witnesses who are unavailable for 
purposes of testifying. Unavailability may be found (1) “on the ground of privilege,” (2) if the witness 
“persists in refusing to testify . . . despite an order of the court,” (3) if the witness “testifies to a lack of 
memory,” (4) if the witness is “unable to be present . . . because of death, or illness or infirmity,” or (5) 
if the proponent of the testimony is “unable to procure the declarant’s attendance . . . by process or 
other reasonable means.” FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1–5). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651–52 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926–27 (8th Cir. 1999); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279; White, 116 F.3d at 911; 
United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667–68 (2d Cir. 1997); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 269, 271–72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/13
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witness is unavailable when he or she is out of the relevant jurisdiction and 
the court is unable to compel the presence of the witness, or it would be a 
significant burden to compel the presence of the witness.44 Complex issues 
arise when the witness is alive and available but cannot recall the events 
about which he or she is required to testify.45 Perhaps the most difficult 
and contentious issues regarding witness availability pertain to whether 
refusal to testify out of fear or embarrassment is sufficient to establish that 
a witness is unavailable. 
Frequently, the witness is afraid of retaliation by the defendant and thus 
refuses to testify. In United States v. Carlson,46 the witness testified before 
a grand jury; however, at trial he refused to testify because the defendant 
feared for his life.47 The court failed to coerce or persuade the witness to 
testify, even after holding him in contempt.48 This refusal to testify, due to 
fear of retaliation, led the court to conclude that the defendant’s 
wrongdoing made the witness unavailable.49 Resultantly, the court 
admitted the grand jury testimony.50 Similarly, in People v. Geraci,51 the 
physical availability of the witness did not mandate confrontation.52 The 
Court admitted grand jury testimony into evidence because it concluded 
that the defendant had attempted to bribe and threaten the witness prior to 
trial.53 
A final type of witness often considered unavailable for purposes of 
forfeiture of confrontation is the traumatized victim of sexual assault or 
abuse. Although refusing to testify under a court order satisfies the 
 44. See United States v. DeGideo, No. 04-100, 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 12238 (D. Penn. June 22, 
2004) (FBI agent who was in Iraq was deposed on video because it was unclear when he would be 
returning to the United States). 
 45. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (standing for the proposition that the 
inability to remember an event does not constitute unavailability). In Owens, the witness suffered a 
head injury but was able to make an out-of-court identification of the defendant. At trial, brain damage 
from the attack prevented the witness from recalling the assault. He was still able to remember his out-
of-court identification. The Court held that the witness was available for cross-examination and 
therefore his recollection of a prior statement was admissible. In its decision, the Court stated that 
cross-examination provides the defendant with “the opportunity to bring out such matters as the 
witness’ bias . . . [and] the very fact that he has a bad memory.” Id. at 559. 
 46. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 47. Id. at 1352–53. 
 48. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1352–53. 
 49. Id. at 1353. 
 50. Id. at 1353–54. See also United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 630 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(admitting grand jury testimony of witness after defendant threatened the witness’ life prior to trial). 
 51. 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995). 
 52. Id. at 820. 
 53. Id. at 821. See also People v. Cotto, 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998) (After concluding that the 
witness had been intimidated, the court permitted the witness to testify regarding pre-murder events, 
and prior statements to police made by the witness were introduced to describe the murder.). 
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“unavailability” requirement,54 refusal to testify due to trauma is 
considered generally insufficient to constitute “unavailability.”55 For 
example, in State v. Jarzbek,56 the court held that a threat made during the 
commission of the crime did not automatically procure the absence of the 
witness such that he was “unavailable” for purposes of testifying in 
court.57 In contrast, in Maryland v. Craig,58 the Supreme Court indicated 
its willingness to look favorably at limited exceptions for young victims of 
sexual assault if the legislature asserted an interest in protecting children 
from the trauma of testifying.59 
B. The Defendant’s Procurement of the Witness’ Absence 
1. A Responsible Share in the Witness’ Absence 
The second issue a court must consider in a forfeiture by wrongdoing 
case is the defendant’s role in procuring the unavailability of the witness.60 
It is unclear to what extent the defendant must have actual knowledge of, 
or participate in, the procurement of the witness’ absence.61 Rule 804(b)(6) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a showing that the defendant is 
 54. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2) (“‘Unavailability as a witness’ includes situations in which the 
declarant . . . persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement 
despite an order of the court to do so.”). 
 55. Friedman suggests that the forfeiture doctrine may be correctly applied where a child victim 
“has been intimidated, either by the abusive conduct itself or by a threatening statement—‘Don’t tell 
anyone!’—that accompanied or followed the conduct.” Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 533–34.  
 56. 529 A.2d 1245 (Conn. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
 57. Id. at 1253 (“The constitutional right of confrontation would have little force, however, if we 
were to find an implied waiver of that right in every instance where the accused, in order to silence his 
victim, uttered threats during the commission of the crime for which he is on trial.”). 
 58. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 59. Id. at 855 (closed-circuit television provided the child victim’s testimony during the trial). 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Craig disagreed with the majority opinion that denying face-to-
face confrontation does not violate the Confrontation Clause “because the Confrontation Clause does 
not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure 
reliable evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-face’ confrontation.” Id. at 862 (emphasis in 
original). See also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1991). Commentators question the purpose of 
cross-examination of child witnesses: “we may suspect that cross-examination is so likely to be 
fruitless that the invocation of the confrontation right is little more than an attempt to intimidate the 
child into not testifying.” Friedman, Principles, supra note 15, at 1037–38. Even so, Friedman still has 
“grave qualms” about not requiring the prosecution to produce the witness. Id. at 1038. 
 60. The Federal Rules of Evidence uses the phrase “engaged or acquiesced,” therefore 
broadening the scope of the role a defendant must have in procuring a witness’s inavailability by 
including both passive and active forms of participation. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 61. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 465 (“And how is participation or acquiescence to be 
determined; is the mere fact that the accused benefited from the murder enough to raise a presumption 
that the accused acquiesced in it?”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/13
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responsible in some fashion for the absence of the witness.62 As a result, 
courts interpreting the forfeiture doctrine have assumed that the objective 
of the doctrine is to deter interference with trial witnesses by holding 
wrongdoing against those witnesses as a forfeiture of the confrontation 
right.63 By focusing on the defendant’s role in procuring the absence of the 
witness, the court places the waiver of the confrontation right in the 
defendant’s hands.  
At present, discouraging witnesses from coming forward is a systemic 
problem, visible nationwide.64 Witness testimony against others is 
discouraged frequently and snitches are frowned upon.65 In contrast, 
punishment for criminal behavior requires autonomous activity by the 
defendant, not generalized societal pressures. Assertions that a witness 
possesses a generalized fear of retaliation are insufficient to apply the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. Only actions directly attributable to 
the defendant, or in which the defendant acquiesced,66 and that result in 
the absence of the witness, will suffice.67 One scholar, Richard Friedman, 
suggests that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing should reach all 
wrongful acts committed by the defendant that result in the witness’ 
unavailability at trial.68 
 62. Friedman generated an extensive but not exclusive list of ways in which a defendant may 
procure the absence of the witness: “murder, intimidation, improper payment, or chicanery, or by 
concealing the declarant or persuading her to absent herself . . . .” Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, 
at 518–19. 
 63. See United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The primary reasoning 
behind this rule is obvious—to deter criminals from intimidating or “taking care of” potential 
witnesses against them.”); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272–73 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 64. See Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, supra note 5. 
 65.  
Whether it’s at school, at work or on the street, people often turn a blind eye to social 
injustice rather than snitch. “There has always been a part of humanity that does not want to 
come forward to report wrongs,” Jennifer Connolly, a psychology professor at York 
University, said yesterday. “It’s something we learn at an early age. If teachers and adults say 
don’t snitch and don’t tattle-tale, then kids learn that.” 
Scott Roberts, Why Witnesses Turn a Blind Eye to Injustice, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 25, 2005, at A23. 
Prosecutors often note the “increasing difficulty of persuading witnesses to identify those who commit 
crimes. Relentless threats of bodily harm, or even death, silence many, officials say. Others have a 
deep-seated distrust of police or are afraid of being labeled a ‘snitch.’ Robert E. Pierre, In D.C., Many 
Eyes But Few Witnesses, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at D1. 
 66. See supra note 60. 
 67. This limits problems where a parent refuses to allow a child to testify. In that case it is the 
parent, not the defendant, who has procured the absence of the witness. See Jarzbek, 529 A.2d at 1245. 
 68. See Friedman, Chutzpah, supra note 18, at 518 n.25 (“One can conceive of situations in 
which it is merely fortuitous that the defendant’s conduct, even if wrongful, caused the declarant’s 
unavailability to testify: Suppose the defendant drives negligently on the way to court, and happens to 
run over the declarant, who was on her way to testify.”). While compelling, the issue raised by Jarzbek 
is beyond the scope of this Note. Assuming that a single threat uttered during the crime is not enough 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. The Burden of Proof 
To prevent defendants from benefiting from their wrongdoing, courts 
are willing to make inferential jumps to find wrongdoing. In United States 
v. West,69 the government did not show any direct connection between the 
witness and the defendant; nonetheless, the court found forfeiture by 
wrongdoing because the witness appeared to have died from a professional 
hit, and because the hit was most likely the result of the defendant’s 
actions.70 
There is a general consensus that the wrongdoing must be established 
by a preponderance of the evidence; however, this is not a uniform 
standard. A majority of circuit courts have ruled that a showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.71 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, 
as well as the New York State Rules of Evidence, both apply the more 
stringent clear and convincing evidence standard before admitting any 
hearsay evidence.72  
Regardless of the standard of proof, the decision is an issue of law for 
the judge to decide.73 Some courts require an evidentiary hearing to 
to invoke the forfeiture doctrine, the question becomes, “[s]hould a witness who is present, but refuses 
to testify out of fear, be considered unavailable but not by wrongdoing by the defendant?” Or 
alternatively, should the witness be considered available, meaning the prosecution must deal with the 
witness’ refusal to testify? 
 69. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 70. Id. at 1134 (applying the residual exception to hearsay evidence, rather than the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing). 
 71. See United v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the preponderance of 
the evidence standard because defendant did not object; and, also holding that there was no forfeiture 
because the government’s only evidence of wrongdoing was seven phone calls made from the 
defendant’s residence to the witness’ employer); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926–27 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (following the preponderance of the evidence standard used to admit co-conspirator 
hearsay); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (discussing constitutional cases liberally in selecting the 
preponderance standard); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying the 
co-conspirator preponderance of the evidence standard); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 
273 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard because “[s]uch a claim of 
waiver is not one which is either unusually subject to deception or disfavored by the law”). 
 72. The Supreme Court’s concern with the reliability of evidence motivated the Fifth Circuit to 
apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in United States v. Thieves, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 
1982). The court noted that in-court identification following tainted identification requires proof of 
reliability by clear and convincing evidence. The government was required to prove not only that the 
defendant caused the witness’ unavailability but also that the purpose of the defendant’s actions was to 
prevent the witness from testifying at trial. Id. at 631 n.17. See also People v. Geraci, 625 N.Y.S.2d 
469, 473 (N.Y. 1995); Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 519–20 (expressing the opinion that the 
significance of waiving the confrontation right creates a colorable argument for applying a higher 
standard of proof). 
 73. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (Instructing that “admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the 
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).”). 
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determine whether the defendant waived his confrontation rights.74 Other 
courts admit the evidence conditioned upon the prosecution meeting its 
burden of proof during the trial.75 The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in 
State v. Keeton,76 held that the defendant had the right to be present at any 
pre-trial hearing where the court determined whether the defendant’s 
actions procured the absence of the witness.77 However, in People v. 
Perkins,78 the New York Supreme Court allowed a witness to testify in 
camera without the defendant or defense counsel present to determine 
whether the defendant intimidated the witness.79 
Frequently, procuring the witness’ absence is the very crime that the 
prosecution is charging.80 For example, the prosecution may wish to admit 
a statement made by the victim under the forfeiture doctrine. As a 
preliminary issue, the judge will decide whether the defendant’s 
wrongdoing procured the unavailability of the witness by evaluating the 
statement of the victim.81 Bootstrapping in this manner is often a 
contentious issue.82 The Supreme Court ostensibly resolved the debate in 
Bourjaily v. United States.83 In Bourjaily, the Court concluded that the 
statements the prosecution wished to admit could be used to prove the 
existence of wrongdoing sufficient to admit the statements.84 In many 
contexts, there is no problem with this policy; however, it does not 
mitigate concerns regarding the accuracy or validity of the statement. 
 74. See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653 (2d Cir. 2001); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 
(an evidentiary hearing is necessary); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(“[t]he judge must hold an evidentiary hearing in the absence of the jury . . . .”). 
 75. See Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 (conditionally admitting the evidence). Cf. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 
1281 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that lower court did not “outstrip the bounds of its discretion in 
declining to convene a special mid-trial evidentiary hearing.” in allowing thirty-seven days of 
testimony in an evidentiary hearing). 
 76. 573 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 77. The appellate court found error in the trial court’s decision to exclude the defendant from any 
pretrial hearing, but overturned the conviction on another basis. Id. at 383. 
 78. 691 N.Y.S.2d 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 79.  Id. at 277 (the court subsequently admitted the witness’ grand jury testimony and out-of-
court statements). 
 80. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 521–22. 
 81. See id. at 522 (explaining that the court must conclude that the defendant committed the act 
which the prosecution is bringing to a jury). 
 82. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 523 (defending the use of bootstrapping).  
 83. 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (considering whether evidence to prove a conspiracy existed must 
be independent from “the statements sought to be admitted.”). 
 84. Id. at 181. The Court opinion notes that its holding does not mean that the prosecution could 
rely completely on the statements in finding a conspiracy. “It may, however, use its own bootstraps, 
together with other support, to overcome the objection.” Id. at 185 (Stevens J., concurring). 
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3. Further Consequences of Wrongful Behavior 
The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is not the only law working to 
protect witness statements. There are two additional arrows in the 
prosecution’s quiver designed to deter wrongful behavior by a defendant: 
first, the wrongful act may be a chargeable crime such as murder, assault, 
or harassment; and second, the wrongful act may constitute the chargeable 
crime of tampering with a witness, victim, or informant.85 Frequently, the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause is a more 
attractive option for two reasons: the burden of proof is much lower,86 and 
the original crime charged may have more significance to the prosecution. 
IV. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON87 
In March 2004, the Supreme Court re-examined its position regarding 
the constitutional right to confrontation.88 The Court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction89 because the prosecution had introduced out-of-
court testimony in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confront any witness testifying against the interests of the defendant.90 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court revisited and subsequently overruled 
its oft-cited 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts,91 which permitted admission 
of hearsay testimony when the witness was unavailable and the statement 
was deemed to contain sufficient “indicia of reliability.”92 
 85. Punishment for witness tampering depends upon a variety of factors, including the 
action constituting witness tampering and the type of crime originally charged. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512 (2000) provides that: 
If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, the 
maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of 
that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any 
offense charged in such case.  
Id. § 1512(j). 
 86. In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard used by most courts, the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime against the 
witness. See supra note 71.  
 87. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 88. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 89. During the initial appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because 
the statement by the defendant’s wife appeared untrustworthy. “The statement contradicted one she 
had previously given” and “she admitted she had shut her eyes during the stabbing.” Id. at 41. The 
Washington Supreme Court took the case on appeal and reversed the appellate court, concluding that 
the testimony was trustworthy. Id. at 41–42. 
 90. Id. at 68 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”). 
 91. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 92. Id. at 66 (A statement is considered to contain indicia of reliability if it “falls within a firmly 
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In Crawford, the prosecution introduced a previously recorded 
statement made to police by the defendant’s wife, Sylvia.93 The state’s 
marital-privilege law94 prevented the defendant’s wife from testifying in 
court, therefore preventing the defendant, Michael Crawford, from cross-
examining his wife.95 In arriving at its decision to admit the out-of-court 
statement, the trial court concluded that the statements bore “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness,” thus eliminating the necessity of providing 
the opportunity for cross-examination.96 
In its decision to reverse the conviction, the Court focused on the 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the 
protections it affords defendants.97 Crawford requires that the right to 
confrontation be applied to all witnesses who “bear testimony” against the 
accused.98 Crawford focuses on a specific type of evidence—testimonial 
statements made by a witness under circumstances that prevent the 
defendant from cross-examining that witness. These statements are the 
sort the Crawford decision ensures are subject to cross-examination.99 
Although the exact definition of testimonial evidence is left for the lower 
courts to hash out, the broadest definition given by the Crawford Court is 
any statement that a reasonable person would believe would be available 
for use in a future trial.100 
The concerns addressed in Crawford are clear. Its failure is the 
considerable uncertainty that attaches to the undefined term “testimonial,” 
rooted hearsay exception [or bears] particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”). 
 93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38–39. Sylvia’s statement to the police was different from the 
defendant’s in that her statement suggested that when the defendant attacked the victim, there was 
nothing in the victim’s hand to justify use of a deadly weapon. Id. at 41. 
 94. One criticism arising out of the Crawford decision is that the marital-privilege law was 
invoked by the defendant Michael Crawford, who then refused to waive the privilege yet objected to 
being unable to cross examine the witness. Lininger, supra note 22, at 23. 
 95. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994).  
 96. The Court determined that “Sylvia was not shifting blame but rather corroborating her 
husband’s story that he acted in self-defense or ‘justified reprisal’; she had direct knowledge as an 
eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she was being questioned by a ‘neutral’ law 
enforcement officer.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
 97. Id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the . . . 
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”).  
 98. Id. at 52, citing with approval Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) 
3 (“[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”). 
 99. An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense 
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the 
history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern 
with a specific type of out-of-court statement. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  
 100. Id. at 52. 
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which the Court intentionally left unclear.101 Instead, the Court satisfied 
itself with disposing of the Roberts test102 and setting forth guidelines that 
protect a defendant’s right to confrontation: if a witness is unavailable103 to 
testify in court, then any out-of-court “testimonial” statements made by 
that witness are admissible only if the defendant has a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness regarding those statements.104 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia recognized that the goal of the Roberts test 
was to ensure that reliable evidence is presented at trial. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine and to explore the accuracy and reliability of the 
statements of a witness is mandated by the Confrontation Clause.105 
Crawford provides limited circumstances in which the right to admit out-
of-court testimony will be permitted: when the evidence is non-
testimonial,106 or when the witness is unavailable and the defense has had 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine.107 Within this final category, the 
Court looked approvingly at the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as a 
rule that does not raise concerns regarding the reliability of evidence.108 
For further clarification, the Court referred to Reynolds v. United States.109 
 101. Id. at 68 (footnote omitted) (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.”). In addition to these clarifications, Justice Scalia’s opinion explains dying 
declarations as “the one deviation” from the definition of testimonial that should remain admissible 
without confrontation. Id. at 56 n.6. “If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui 
generis.” Id. This hints at a drastic shift in hearsay exceptions. Neil Cohen and Donald Paine suggest 
that excited utterances and certain medical diagnosis and treatment may be testimonial under certain 
circumstances. Neil P. Cohen & Donald F. Paine, Crawford v. Washington: Confrontation Revolution, 
40 TENN. B.J. 22, 23 (2004). 
 102. The Crawford Court dismissed the Roberts test after concluding that “[a]dmitting statements 
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.” Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 61. 
 103. “Unavailability” is another term that is not explained in the Crawford decision. The Court’s 
sparse discussion of the unavailability element includes positive treatment of Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 
719, 722–25 (1968) (requiring a good faith effort by the prosecution to procure the availability of the 
witness) and Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 470–72 (1900) (explaining that the government’s 
failure to guard a witness who had been arrested was error on the part of the government). Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 57. This Note does not argue that the Crawford decision changed the meaning of the term 
“unavailable” for purposes of Confrontation Clause doctrine. 
 104. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 105. Although reliability is the end, the means to that end must be through cross-examination, not 
the conclusions of a judge: the Confrontation Clause requires “not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner.” Id. at 61. 
 106. Id. at 68. (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ 
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .” The Court points to 
business records and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy as examples of nontestimonial 
statements. Id. at 56. 
 107. Id. at 59. 
 108. Forfeiture by wrongdoing “make[s] no claim to be a surrogate means of assessing 
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In Reynolds, the trial court concluded that the witness was unavailable 
as a result of the defendant’s actions. The burden was on the defendant to 
refute this assertion.110 Although it did not hesitate to affirm the lower 
court decision to admit the previous statement, the Supreme Court 
expressed an interest in limiting prior statements to “competent 
evidence.”111 The statements admitted by the trial court were made in a 
prior trial of the defendant for the same offense—a full opportunity to 
cross-examine had occurred in this prior trial.112 The Reynolds Court 
defended the waiver by wrongdoing doctrine as a rule that enforces 
fairness: a defendant cannot complain if he is responsible for the witness’s 
absence.113 This early Supreme Court interpretation of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine did not expressly extend to all statements made by 
the unavailable witness; instead, the only clear message it evinced was that 
the forfeiture doctrine could admit evidence considered competent.114 
V. POST-CRAWFORD DECISIONS 
Since Crawford, attorneys, academics, and courts alike have shown 
extraordinary concern regarding the proper classification of out-of-court 
testimony.115 To avoid the possibility of evidence becoming blocked by 
the re-invigorated confrontation rule, prosecutors have frequently argued 
that Crawford is distinguishable and therefore irrelevant to the present 
case.116 Post-Crawford, courts have shown a willingness to consider one of 
the three exceptions approved of by the Crawford Court in order to admit 
reliability.” Id. at 62. 
 109. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 110. Id. at 160–61 (holding that it was the defendant’s choice to not take the stand and swear that 
he had played no part in the witness’ absence; the burden had been satisfied by the prosecution and 
therefore shifted to the defendant). 
 111. Id. at 158. 
 112. Id. at 159, 161 (the prior testimony that was admitted was for the same defendant for the 
same offense, and the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness). 
 113. Id. at 158. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 517–18. 
 114. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158. 
 115. See J. Wayne Capp, Recent Keynote Affecting the Montana Practitioners, 65 MONT L. REV. 
411, 424 (2004); Cohen & Payne, supra note 101; Gerald Uelmen, Preserving Crawford Objections, 
28 CHAMPION 46 (July 2004). 
 116. See United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a confession made 
to a relative who later testifies on behalf of the prosecution is considered only a casual statement to an 
acquaintance and therefore not testimonial); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (a 
statement by a stabbing victim in which she accused her boyfriend of domestic assault was an excited 
utterance, and the defendant forfeited the confrontation right by later killing her). 
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out-of-court statements in trial: the dying declaration exception,117 the 
forfeiture exception,118 and the non-testimonial exception.119 
Although Crawford indicated that statements made during police 
interrogations are “testimonial,” even the phrase “police interrogation” is 
vague and subject to dispute.120 In Hammon v. Indiana,121 police at the 
scene questioned a victim of domestic abuse immediately after an 
incident.122 Because questioning occurred at the scene, the court ruled that 
the statement was not testimonial123 in nature, and that therefore the 
Constitution did not mandate confrontation.124 In Rogers v. State,125 the 
Indiana Court of Appeals held that preliminary investigations at the scene 
of the crime were not police investigations.126 Courts that do not classify 
all statements to police as “testimonial” apply a strict interpretation of the 
Crawford decision.127 By focusing on the formality of the interrogations,128 
numerous courts have admitted evidence as non-testimonial.129 
 117. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (claiming that this exception to the hearsay rule is sui generis). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 68 (“[W]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”). 
 120. If all statements to police officers are considered testimonial, strange outcomes may result. 
While an excited utterance to police may be testimonial, “if the bystander makes the same excited 
utterance to another bystander at the scene, it is arguable that the statement is not testimonial.” Cohen 
& Paine, supra note 101, at 23. 
 121. 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), cert. granted, 126 
S.Ct. 552 (2005). For purposes of this Note, all references to this case refer to the case as heard and 
decided by the Court of Appeals of Indiana in 2004. 
 122. When police arrived, they noted that the victim was “timid and frightened” and when the 
defendant approached, the victim “became quiet and seemed afraid.” 809 N.E.2d at 947–48. 
 123. The court held that the police interview was “informal” and encompassed only “preliminary 
investigatory questions . . . . Such interaction with witnesses on the scene does not fit within a lay 
conception of police ‘interrogation,’ bolstered by television, as encompassing an ‘interview’ in a room 
at the stationhouse. It also does not bear the hallmarks of an improper ‘inquisitorial practice.’” Id. at 
952. 
 124. The court admitted the statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
prohibition. Id. at 949. 
 125. 814 N.E.2d 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 126. Id. at 701 (citing Hammon, 809 N.E.2d 945). 
 127. See supra note 96; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004); United States v. 
Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 209 (2d Cir. 2004) (a letter to a boyfriend, which the author “had no reason to 
expect . . . would ever find its way into the hands of the police” was nontestimonial). But see United 
States v. Hendricks, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8854, at *3 (D.V.I. Apr. 27, 2004) (interpreting the 
Crawford decision as “barring all out-of-court statements . . . whom a defendant has not had the 
chance to cross-examine, with the exceptions only for dying declarations and forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.”). 
 128. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government 
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not.”). 
 129. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 210 (Me. 2004) (finding that a voluntary statement 
where the police did not engage in “structured” questioning was not testimonial). But see People v. 
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In contrast, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion 
regarding the testimonial nature of statements made to police. For 
example, in State v. Meeks,130 the Supreme Court of Kansas considered a 
case wherein the victim made a statement to police and bystanders 
implicating the defendant. The victim subsequently lost consciousness 
and, soon thereafter, died.131 The court indicated that it believed that the 
victim’s statement at the scene was testimonial in nature, because the 
statement was made to a police officer interrogating the victim.132 
Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statement was 
admissible under the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing.133 The defendant 
had no opportunity to cross-examine or confront the witness about those 
statements because the witness died less than two hours after the shooting. 
The police officer’s questioning was the closest the defendant got to cross-
examining the victim.134 
After Crawford, forfeiture by wrongdoing has become a more reliable 
tool for introducing out-of-court statements against defendants.135 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a waiver of the 
confrontation right also constituted a waiver of the right to object to any 
hearsay evidence.136 In People v. Jiles,137 the California Court of Appeals 
admitted a victim’s statement under the forfeiture doctrine rather than the 
Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (victim had filed an application for a 
restraining order which was considered an ex parte declaration and therefore testimonial and 
inadmissible unless the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine); Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565 
(Tex. App. 2004) (police investigation at the side of the road is interrogation and therefore testimonial 
because Crawford intended to protect a colloquial meaning of investigation). 
 130. 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004). 
 131. Id. at 792. 
 132. Id. at 793. There were also at least four witnesses around the victim at the time of the 
accusation. Id. at 794. 
 133. Id. at 793–94 (“We need not determine whether the response was testimonial or not, 
however, because we hold that Meeks forfeited his right to confrontation by killing the witness . . . .”). 
Applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule required the court to bootstrap, finding the defendant 
guilty by a preponderance of the evidence of murder in order to introduce the out of court statement to 
the jury for the same charge. This technique was advocated in amicus briefs for Crawford, 541 U.S. 
36. 
 134. Meeks, 88 P.3d at 792. 
 135. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (acknowledging the tension between Crawford and White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), which allowed the admission of a spontaneous declaration to a police 
officer by a child victim). Likewise, the fate of the dying declaration exception is unclear. Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
 136. Meeks, 88 P.3d at 794 (“[A] waiver of the right to confrontation based upon the procurement 
of the absence of the witness also constitutes a waiver of any hearsay objections to prior statements of 
the absent witness.”).  
 137. 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (depublished). 
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dying declaration exception.138 The victim had been beaten and stabbed 
severely; when the police arrived at the scene, the victim gave the name of 
the defendant as her attacker, and within the next hour she died.139 In order 
to admit the evidence, the court referred to the Crawford dictum regarding 
the defendant’s capacity to forfeit the right to confrontation.140 
VI. ANALYSIS OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
Expansion of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine has occurred 
gradually.141 A primary justification for this expansion is the perception 
that the “culture of intimidation,”142 which the forfeiture doctrine is 
designed to discourage, has accelerated. For instance, it is now more likely 
that before any deposition, grand jury, or preliminary hearing occurs, the 
defendant may attempt to prevent a witness from testifying.143 In an effort 
to limit the efficacy of a campaign of intimidation, courts have admitted 
out-of-court statements gathered earlier in the process, before any 
formalized proceedings have begun. Further expansion of the doctrine is 
evinced by the low burden of proof required to establish that a witness is 
unavailable and that the defendant played a role in the absence of that 
witness.144 This shift in the doctrine’s application has two important 
effects: first, an increase in the incentive to apply the doctrine, and second, 
a decrease in the reliability of any evidence admitted under the doctrine.145 
 138. Id. at 796 (“Regardless of whether her statement qualified as a dying declaration, ‘the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds.’”). But see United States v. Hendricks, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8854, at *5 (D.V.I. Apr. 27, 
2004) (discussing that the court did not admit statements of the government informant because there 
was insufficient proof to link the defendant to the death of the witness.). 
 139. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 793. 
 140. Id. at 795. 
 141. Early cases like Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1978), applied the rule to ensure the 
admission of former testimony against the defendant. Recent court decisions have allowed 
conversations with police even before any criminal charges have been filed. See supra notes 36–39 
and accompanying text. 
 142. See Editorial, Conspiracy of Silence, BALT. SUN, Feb. 16, 2004, at 18A. 
 143. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 77 (discussing that the defendant in State v. Keeton, 573 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1998), was not allowed to be present at the hearing to determine unavailability of the 
witness.). 
 145. Compare statements introduced in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) where prior 
cross-examination occurred, with statements introduced in United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 
(1st Cir. 1996), where the statements introduced at trial were made to police during a drug 
investigation. 
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A. Burden of Proof and its Effect 
Due to the importance the confrontation right plays in ensuring a fair 
trial, waiver of that right must be monitored closely.146 The decision to 
move for a waiver of the confrontation right, instead of charging the 
defendant with witness tampering, reveals important information 
regarding the prosecution’s evidence and case strategy.147 Application of 
the forfeiture doctrine indicates either insufficient evidence to charge the 
defendant with the asserted wrongdoing, or alternatively, it may show that 
the prosecution places more value on a conviction under the original 
charge rather than on a new charge.148 By removing hurdles to the 
admission of evidence, the incentive for the prosecutor to push forward in 
the original case becomes magnified. 
A majority of courts currently apply the preponderance of the evidence 
standard rather than the clear and convincing standard in determining 
forfeiture by wrongdoing.149 When selecting a standard of proof in a 
criminal case, it is important to mind the significance of an incorrect 
conclusion by the court.150 Requiring a preliminary hearing to determine 
waiver has the potential to force the prosecution to disclose its theory of 
the case and would consume additional court time. These detractions must 
be balanced against the defendant’s interest in a fair trial and the 
protections afforded by the Constitution.151 
After Crawford, the breadth of the term “unavailable” remains 
unclear.152 By preluding the admission of testimony under the Roberts 
“indicia of reliability standard,” Crawford creates an incentive for 
prosecutors to expand their use of the term “unavailable” to avoid having 
to place a witness on the stand in trial.153 More importantly, Crawford 
creates an incentive for prosecutors to assert that the witness is unavailable 
as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing, therefore also eliminating the 
 146. See supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 148. See id. The time and effort required to bring a new charge, balanced with the time and effort 
already exerted in a current trial at which a witness is no longer available, may influence the 
prosecution’s decision. 
 149. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 520 n.33 (“If the court errs in either direction on 
the predicate question of whether the defendant wrongfully rendered the declarant unavailable, the 
negative consequences are substantial.”). 
 151. See supra notes 72–74. 
 152. See Cohen & Paine, supra note 101, at 24 (“[T]he prosecution must make some effort to get 
the declarant to testify, but how heroic do those efforts have to be?”). 
 153. In this situation, Crawford guarantees the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness, but not at trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
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prior cross-examination requirement.154 In the first scenario, the 
defendant’s confrontation right ostensibly remains intact because of the 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Without clear boundaries, 
the second situation creates a potential loophole to circumvent the 
Confrontation Clause.155 Both the uncertainty of the term “unavailable,” 
and the uncertainty regarding the responsible share required to apply the 
forfeiture doctrine, encourage testing the limits of these terms to admit 
statements without the opportunity for cross examination. 
B. Forfeiture and Reliability 
Courts explain the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as an equitable 
solution to a serious problem.156 In some ways, the effectiveness of the 
doctrine is underestimated; in other ways, it is overestimated. Richard 
Friedman explains that as an attempt to promote fairness, the doctrine is 
successful not because it prevents a defendant from benefiting from his 
wrongdoing, but because the defendant has chosen to keep a witness from 
testifying in court and should not be allowed to complain about that 
witness’ statements when they are admitted during trial.157 The Crawford 
Court recognized the difficulty in making an objective determination about 
the reliability of an out-of-court statement.158 Resultantly, the Crawford 
Court reached the conclusion that the reliability of a statement is irrelevant 
in forfeiture cases.159 Arguably, then, the weight of any statement admitted 
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is magnified because those 
statements are labeled implicitly as trustworthy.  
 154. Id. at 1370. 
 155. Crawford gives no indication of future changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence definition of 
an unavailable witness. See supra notes 42–59 and accompanying text. 
 156. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Falk v. United 
States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 460 (D.C. 1899) (“Neither in criminal nor in civil cases will the law allow a 
person to take advantage of his own wrong.”). Friedman argues that courts are incorrect in suggesting 
that the doctrine is intended only to ensure that “no one should profit by his own wrong;” instead, the 
law merely eliminates the right “to complain about the consequences of his own conduct.” Friedman, 
Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 516–17. Therefore, the doctrine should apply even when the defendant 
would not benefit by his wrongdoing because the wrong he committed is worse than the crime for 
which he is currently on trial. Id.  
 157. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 517. The absence of a witness from court does not 
ensure that the defendant will be better off because the defendant may still be convicted of the crime. 
Alternately, the absence of a witness is not necessarily essential for the defendant to be acquitted of the 
crime. Id. at 516–17. 
 158. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (“Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.”).  
 159. After the Court rejected the Roberts test because it required a judge to determine reliability, 
the Crawford Court maintained that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine “does not purport to be an 
alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62. 
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The assertion that application of the forfeiture doctrine eliminates 
concerns about the reliability of witness statements is overly broad.160 In 
cases where an individual is subject to criminal liability and restraint of 
freedom, accuracy must always be an objective. The forfeiture doctrine 
should not be indifferent to the reliability of the statement; instead, 
forfeiture should be interpreted as an indication that the witness statement 
is more likely to be reliable because the defendant prevented the witness 
from testifying—admitting statements under the forfeiture doctrine that 
are clearly inaccurate or false only impedes the judicial process. Thus, the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine may waive the constitutional right to 
confrontation,161 but any statement admitted must possess at least a 
modicum of credibility.162 
There is currently a limit on the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements, but it merely provides a weak and distant backstop to the 
forfeiture doctrine. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence balances the 
probative value against the potential prejudice of admitting the 
evidence.163 Although Rule 403 appears to provide a sufficient degree of 
protection against outlandish and prejudicial testimony,164 the defendant’s 
burden of establishing prejudice is difficult to meet.165 As a general rule, 
courts are more inclined to admit evidence, especially after a finding of 
wrongdoing.166 
 160. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. “The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is, 
by its language and historical underpinnings, a personal right of the accused and is intended for his 
benefit. As such, this right, like other federally guaranteed rights, can be waived by the accused.” 
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357–58 (8th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). 
 161. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 162. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has left in place the distinction between hearsay and 
the confrontation right: “[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.” 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 163. “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. 
R. EVID. 403. 
 164. See Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Tales From the Crypt: An Examination 
of Forfeiture by Misconduct and its Applicability to the Texas Legal System, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 99, 
132 (1999). 
 165. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The balance 
under the Rule, therefore, should be struck in favor of admissibility.”). 
 166. See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“[i]n order to avoid the admission of facially unreliable 
hearsay, the district court should undertake a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect in 
accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 403.”); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994) (the court recommended looking for “facially 
unreliable hearsay” under FED. R. EVID. 403). See also Flanagan, supra note 12, at 526 (After 
wrongdoing by the defendant, the Sixth Amendment is not available to the defendant; it leaves “any 
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VII. CRAWFORD DEFINES THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT, BUT IT IS THE 
MEANING OF “TESTIMONIAL,” “UNAVAILABILITY,” AND 
“RESPONSIBILITY” THAT WILL SHAPE THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE 
An unavoidable consequence of handing down a decision as novel as 
Crawford is the legal community’s resistance to change.167 Justice Scalia’s 
opinion is simple and incontrovertible: the Confrontation Clause is 
susceptible to infringements and must be protected.168 The Court’s holding 
broadens the confrontation rights of the accused by eliminating a judge’s 
ability to waive those rights.169 Unfortunately, this interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause is formless without defining the term 
“testimonial.”170 By applying a broad definition of “testimonial,” the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing becomes an escape device for 
prosecutors who are otherwise limited by the confrontation rights of the 
defendant.171 
A. Crawford, Confrontation, and the Reliability of Out-of-Court Witness 
Statements 
Crawford provides four forms of witness statements that must be 
“testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.172 The Court goes 
no further in defining “testimonial,” but emphasizes that its chief concern 
constitutional question of the reliability of the evidence to other parts of the Constitution, including the 
Due Process Clause, which does bar evidence that is ‘totally lacking in reliability.’”). But Rule 403 is 
used infrequently. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Rule 403 is an 
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”). 
 167. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“Stare decisis is . . . by and large 
. . . the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development 
of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process.”) (citation omitted). 
 168. Id. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation.”). 
 169. Justice Scalia praises the “Framers’ wisdom in rejecting a general reliability exception” 
because “[t]he framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even 
core confrontation violations.” Id. at 62–63. See also supra note 102. 
 170. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 171. In State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004), “[o]fficer Hall was arguably conducting an 
interrogation when he asked Green if he knew who shot him”; however, the court remained 
unconcerned: “[w]e need not determine whether the response was testimonial or not, however, because 
we hold that Meeks forfeited his right to confrontation by killing the witness.” Id. at 793–94. Cf. 
People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that the witness statement 
was not testimonial, however, the court applied the forfeiture doctrine). 
 172. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“[I]t applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”).  
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regards the testimony of witnesses who have been subjected to an ex parte 
examination.173 The Crawford Court’s concern about these forms of 
testimonial evidence is appropriate because they are formalized statements 
and therefore inherently more persuasive to a jury.174 
Forfeiture by wrongdoing should distinguish between ex parte 
formalized statements and off-hand remarks by a witness. Making an 
official statement indicates to the witness that the statement will be relied 
on in the investigation and potentially the prosecution of the accused.175 A 
finding by the court that the defendant forfeited the right to confrontation 
should not mitigate the underlying goal of presenting accurate 
testimony.176 Pursuant to the forfeiture doctrine, all witness statements, 
regardless of the formality of the statements, enjoy the same deference and 
respect from the court (although the fact-finder enjoys final discretion 
regarding the amount of weight to give to a statement).177 
B. The Forfeiture Doctrine Before and After Crawford is Pushed to its 
Furthest Limits 
Legitimate concerns about the reliability of testimonial evidence served 
as the impetus for both the “indicia of reliability” standard, as well as the 
Crawford decision.178 Although confrontation does not ensure that 
evidence will be accurate, it affords the defendant the opportunity to show 
the jury any weaknesses in the testimony.179 In Crawford’s wake, some 
 173. Id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was . . . [the] 
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”). Cf. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
364 (1992) (Thomas J. concurring) (demonstrating concern that statements to an investigating police 
officer may be “the functional equivalent of in-court testimony because the statements arguably were 
made in contemplation of legal proceedings.”). 
 174. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government 
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not.”). Because of this substantive difference, the Crawford Court rejected a reliability standard that 
“applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This 
often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the 
Clause.” Id. at 60. 
 175. See supra note 98. 
 176. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 177. See State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 792 (Kan. 2004) (the statement to police immediately 
before dying was admitted under the forfeiture doctrine). 
 178. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) describes the Clause’s core concern: 
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was . . . not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to 
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the 
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. 
Id. at 242. 
 179. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[I]t is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”). 
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courts have found ways around the limits established in Crawford when 
considering whether a statement is testimonial.180 
Hammon v. Indiana illustrates a strict application of the Crawford 
decision.181 The Hammon court construed Crawford to distinguish 
between police interrogations and police questioning at the scene of the 
crime, holding that the latter is not “testimonial.”182 Defining “testimonial” 
statements should not be such a narrow and precise exercise.183 Hammon 
focused incorrectly on the meaning of “interrogation.” Alternatively, it 
should have considered the expectations a witness may have in making 
accusatory statements to the police.184 Unlike statements to an 
acquaintance,185 when talking to a police officer, a witness likely has the 
impression that his statement may be used in furtherance of the 
investigation and prosecution of an individual.186 The court should also 
consider the Supreme Court’s aversion towards ex parte statements and 
the ultimate objective of providing the defendant with the opportunity to 
confront those witnesses in trial.187 
In contrast to Hammond, in United States v. Savier, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana appropriately refused to 
consider the formality of the interrogation in determining the statement’s 
testimonial quality.188 The court concluded that Justice Scalia’s distinction 
between legal and colloquial interrogations189 indicated a broader 
interpretation than the Miranda definition of “interrogation.”190 Likewise 
in State v. Meeks, the Kansas Supreme Court also applied a less stringent 
interpretation of the term “interrogation.”191 In this case, the court 
 180. See supra notes 115–40 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 183. The Indiana court focused on the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “police interrogation” 
and concluded a “police ‘interrogation’ is not the same as, and is much narrower than, police 
‘questioning.’” Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 184. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 185. The Hammon court asserts that an excited utterance “by definition, has not been made in 
contemplation of its use in a future trial.” Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 953. 
 186. See supra note 99. 
 187. See supra note 97. 
 188. United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (The fact that the 
defendant in this case was “not in custody when he made the statements to the prosecutor . . . does not 
appear to be a meaningful distinction under Crawford.”). 
 189. The Crawford Court was careful to note that it was using the “term ‘interrogation’ in its 
colloquial, rather than any technical, legal sense.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
 190. See Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (“If the Court wanted to limit Crawford to statements 
given in the custodial setting, it could have simply borrowed the familiar definition of interrogation 
from the Miranda context.”). 
 191. See State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004). 
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classified the questioning of the victim by the police officer as 
testimonial.192 
VIII. PROPOSAL 
It is inevitable that some form of the forfeiture doctrine will continue to 
play an important role in the criminal justice process. This Note does not 
question the constitutionality of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as 
an exception to the Confrontation Clause. This Note acknowledges that it 
is well-established that even without a codified version of the forfeiture 
doctrine, state courts employ the rule to admit evidence.193 Generally 
speaking, this Note supports the use of the doctrine, but argues that 
standards for the doctrine’s application, as well as limits on its use, must 
be employed to ensure that it is not abused, specifically in the criminal 
justice process. 
Crawford places the right to confrontation on a pedestal for at least two 
reasons: an interest in finding the truth194 and an interest in promoting 
fairness.195 In Crawford, Justice Scalia asserts that forfeiture is an 
equitable solution, and is not concerned with reliability. In contrast, the 
Crawford decision is based on the importance of providing confrontation 
and the risks associated with granting judges the discretion and authority 
to waive that right.196 Adoption of a set of proposals will help ensure that 
in the context of criminal trials, confrontation and forfeiture are more 
fairly balanced. 
This Note suggests that statements admitted under the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine fall into three categories: statements in which there is 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination, formalized ex parte statements, 
and informal ex parte statements. This Note urges limiting the application 
of the forfeiture doctrine when the statement at issue falls in the third 
category. Moreover, this Note recommends that courts adopt a broad 
definition of “testimonial.” As a means of ensuring accurate testimony in 
forfeiture by wrongdoing cases, only “testimonial” statements should be 
 192. Id. at 793. In its analysis, the court showed hesitancy in its conclusion. It applied the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and refused to hold that the statement was testimonial. See supra 
note 171. 
 193. See supra note 22. See also State v. Fields, 679 N.W. 2d 341, 347–48 (Minn. 2004); 
Linninger supra note 22, at 807 (recommending that all states adopt some form of the forfeiture 
doctrine to ensure that the prosecution does “not overlook an opportunity to apply this doctrine.”). 
 194. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“The [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate 
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence.”). 
 195. See supra note 99. 
 196. See supra note 102. 
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admissible. Finally, before admitting statements under the forfeiture 
doctrine, the prosecution should demonstrate to the court that good faith 
efforts were made to obtain the presence of the witness at trial. 
Adopting a broad definition of “testimonial” will help protect the 
forfeiture doctrine from abuse. Questioning conducted by police officers in 
most contexts should be considered testimonial evidence.197 When a 
witness speaks with the police, his statements are not off-hand or casual. 
Statements to police fit easily in the category of statements that a 
reasonable person would believe would be available for use in a future 
trial.198 Adopting this interpretation of testimonial statements resolves 
concerns that Justice Scalia had regarding ex parte accusatory 
statements199—specifically those statements that a declarant believes may 
be used prosecutorially.200 While refusing to define “interrogation” or 
“testimonial,” Justice Scalia’s decision seems to favor a definition that is 
broad enough to include most statements to police officers.201 
Next, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine should be applied only 
when prosecutors wish to introduce testimonial evidence.202 While treating 
the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing favorably,203 Justice Scalia’s 
reference to Reynolds v. United States204 supports a limited admissibility 
standard.205 A testimonial statement that may be admissible under the 
forfeiture doctrine likely satisfies the desire for competent evidence in two 
unique ways: the statement is made under the impression that it will be 
used in the investigation and prosecution of the defendant,206 and the 
 197. Friedman’s conception of the Confrontation Clause covers any occurrence where “the 
declarant makes a statement, either directly to a law enforcement officer or through an intermediary, 
that she realizes will likely aid in the investigation or prosecution of a crime.” Friedman, Chutzpa, 
supra note 18, at 514. This Note does not consider other types of evidence that may or may not be 
testimonial. Professor Lininger presents a broad discussion of some alternate theories on the scope of 
testimonial statements. See Lininger, supra note 22, at 773–81 (presenting arguments about how the 
“testimonial statements” requirement extends to 911 calls and excited utterances to police officers). 
See also Cohen & Paine, supra note 101, at 23 (considering whether information gathered in a “rape 
kit” is testimonial). 
 198. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 98. 
 200. The Crawford Court acknowledged that police statements are “not sworn testimony, but the 
absence of oath was not dispositive.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
 201. See supra notes 188–90. 
 202. See supra notes 97–101, 120–34 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 204. The Reynolds Court discerned no violation of the Confrontation Clause where “competent 
evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away.” Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 158 
(1878). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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statement is preserved in a more formal condition for future use.207 
Statements made to the police possess at least a modicum of credibility, 
satisfying a low standard for competent evidence.208 Limiting application 
of the doctrine to “testimonial” statements ensures that prosecutors have 
flexibility to use the forfeiture doctrine. It precludes use of the doctrine, 
however, unless the statement is made with the belief that it could be used 
in a future prosecution of the defendant. 
Of course, the initial concern remains: certain types of testimonial 
statements are more reliable and more credible than others.209 When 
considering whether to admit any testimonial statements without the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, courts should separate testimony 
into three categories: first, testimony where the defendant had the 
opportunity to cross-examine, which is admissible merely by showing 
unavailability;210 second, testimony made under oath but without the 
opportunity for cross-examination;211 and third, ex parte statements not 
made under oath and with no opportunity for cross-examination.212 The 
difference between these types of statements should be reflected in the 
scrutiny with which the forfeiture doctrine is applied (the third category of 
statement should rarely be admitted). 
As stated previously, the two essential elements of any forfeiture by 
wrongdoing case are unavailability and the defendant’s wrongful 
procurement of the witness. These issues are for the judge to determine, 
and may be ruled on at any time before the end of the trial; however, the 
conditional admission of an out-of-court statement made during trial, 
under the forfeiture doctrine, remains too prejudicial.213 In addition, 
concerns raised about judicial economy ignore the importance of the 
confrontation right as well as the infrequency with which this issue will be 
raised. 
 207. At a minimum, the statement would be in a written police report, made shortly after the 
incident occurred. David Feige opposes admission of any out-of-court records. He sees domestic abuse 
cases as prime examples of “the paternalistic philosophy of prosecution that the Roberts rule enabled” 
by introducing victim statements even if they are uninterested in testifying against their current or 
former intimate partners. David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court Kills Evidence Based 
Prosecution, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2097041. Professor Lininger responds 
that the “so-called ‘autonomy’ of the accuser is illusory in many domestic violence cases.” Lininger, 
supra note 22, at 783. 
 208. See supra note 70–72 and accompanying text (discussing the “culture of intimidation” that 
has encouraged the lowering of the standards). 
 209. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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In all cases of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the prosecution should have 
the burden of showing that a good-faith effort was made to obtain the 
witness’ presence.214 Because this is testimony made against the accused, 
courts must expect that a good-faith effort constitutes a higher than usual 
standard.215 If a witness refuses to testify, the judge may issue a court 
order compelling the witness to testify or be subject to arrest.216 Of course, 
courts are typically unwilling to criminalize a victim’s reticence because it 
discourages the utilization of the legal system out of fear of legal 
reprisal.217 
If a statement falls in the third category because it is made to police 
officers, but not under oath, the court should be wary about waiving the 
defendant’s confrontation rights. This decision must be made on a case-
by-case basis. Under these circumstances, before admitting the testimony, 
the judge should be able to point to specific evidence that the government 
made good faith efforts to produce the witness in court, that the statements 
made are credible, and that the witness’ absence is a result of the 
defendant’s actions. Heightened scrutiny will protect the Confrontation 
Clause,218 while encouraging police and prosecutors to take formal 
statements and depositions of witnesses whenever they suspect the 
possibility that a witness will later become unavailable to testify as a result 
of wrongdoing by the defendant.219 
 214. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968) (“In short, a witness is not “unavailable” 
for purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial 
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.”). 
 215. See State v. Scholz, 432 A.2d 763, 765 (Me. 1981) (citing MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 253 
(2d ed. 1972)) (“[I]t has been said that where, as in the instant case, former testimony is sought to be 
offered against the accused, the degree of effort constituting ‘good faith’ and ‘due diligence’ is greater 
than the degree required in other situations.”). Friedman agrees with a policy requiring substantial 
efforts be made to ensure confrontation of some form: “The prosecution should bear the burden of 
taking all reasonable steps to protect whatever aspects of confrontation are possible given the 
defendant’s conduct . . . .” Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 18, at 525. 
 216. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2). 
 217. See Feige, supra note 207 (“Though not unheard of, dragging the alleged victim into court in 
handcuffs and forcing her to testify is generally considered unseemly. It is also often 
counterproductive, since a witness hellbent on avoiding testifying will rarely provide the kind of 
performance prosecutors can rely on for a conviction.”). 
 218. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
 219. See Lininger, supra note 22, at 783–84 (“[L]egislatures should expand opportunities for 
pretrial cross-examination of hearsay declarants,” but whatever prior cross-examination is provided 
“need not have been skillful or zealous in order to be minimally adequate under Crawford.”). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Crawford v. Washington indicates the Supreme Court’s renewed 
concern with the right to confrontation. The decision is a drastic change 
from the Roberts era “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 
standard,”220 and it will take time to determine the meaning of the Court’s 
decision. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority provides a roadmap for 
future interpretation and should be followed carefully. 
Stronger confrontation rights should not be seen merely as obstacles to 
be circumnavigated. The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing serves an 
important purpose in ensuring that the defendant does not succeed in 
procuring the absence of a witness prior to trial. Assertions that a witness 
has been tampered with do not provide carte blanche forfeiture of 
confrontation rights. Courts must consider the manner in which any 
witness statement is made. Only statements made with the expectation that 
they will be used later in the investigation and prosecution of a defendant 
should be admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Admission of other 
statements under the forfeiture doctrine will have little deterrent effect on 
the actions of the defendant because the defendant will have no reason to 
believe that the witness will testify against him, and thus, no reason to 
influence the witness because those statements lack credibility and 
accuracy. 
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